

Mortgage Foreclosures in New York: An Evolving Crisis

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Chairs Lopez, Weinstein and Robinson, I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is Caitlyn Brazill and I am the Director of Policy and Communications at New York University's Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy. The Furman Center is a joint research center of the New York University School of Law and the University's Robert F. Wagner School of Public Service. Since its founding in 1995, the Furman Center has become a leading academic research center devoted to the public policy aspects of land use, real estate development, and housing. We provide objective academic and empirical research on affordable housing, housing finance and foreclosure, land use, and neighborhood change. We challenge assumptions and promote frank dialogue through our varied events and conferences, and regularly provide essential data and analysis on housing markets, demographic trends, and quality-of-life indicators to community-based organizations, policymakers, the real estate and finance industries, and the media. NYU's Furman Center has published over 15 rigorous empirical studies or policy analyses on the causes and consequences of the foreclosure crisis, focusing primarily on New York City.

I would like to make three key points today, based on our research in New York City, although, where possible, I will include data about trends in the rest of New York State. First, the foreclosure crisis is far from over. Second, foreclosures affect not only those homeowners who lose their homes, but also their tenants, their children, their neighbors, and local governments. Finally, our research indicates that foreclosure counseling does make a difference in outcomes for distressed borrowers.

The Crisis Continues

Since 2007, lenders have filed foreclosure notices on over 53,000 1- to 4-family homes in New York City.¹ These properties are concentrated in communities that had high levels of subprime lending in the mid-2000s, such as Southeast Queens and Central Brooklyn. These neighborhoods have foreclosure rates that rival severely economically depressed areas such as Detroit or “Sand Belt” cities like Salinas, CA or Jacksonville, FL.²

Throughout New York State, no community has been immune from this crisis. The foreclosure rates in Allegheny and Montgomery counties are comparable to those of the Bronx and Brooklyn.³ At the end of 2010, more than 82,000 loans were in foreclosure statewide,⁴ and more than 18,000 pre-foreclosure notices were filed across the state in the first three quarters of this year.⁵

The number of new foreclosure filings in New York City slowed in 2011, compared to the two previous years: nearly 10,000 new foreclosures were issued in the first three quarters of this year compared to roughly 15,000 and 13,500 in the first three quarters of 2009 and 2010,

¹NYU Furman Center analysis of data from Public Data Corporation.

²The annual foreclosure rates for 2010 were: 4.1 percent for Jamaica, Queens; 4.2 percent for Detroit, Jacksonville, and Salinas. Sources: NYU Furman Center analysis of data from Public Data Corporation and RealtyTrac.

³The quarterly foreclosure rates per 1,000 mortgages for Q2 2011 were: 5.2 for Allegheny, 5.5 for the Bronx, 5.8 for Kings, and 5.1 for Montgomery. Source: Current Foreclosures per 1,000 mortgages, June 2011. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Accessed Nov. 2011 at: <http://data.newyorkfed.org/creditconditionsmap/>

⁴Aggregated Prime, Subprime and Alt-A State Loan Conditions. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, November 2010. Accessed Nov. 2011 at: <http://www.newyorkfed.org/creditconditions/>

⁵New York Foreclosures. Accessed Nov. 2011 at: <http://www.foreclosures.com/new-york/>

respectively.⁶ Statewide, there appears to be a similar decline in the first two quarters of 2011.⁷ While promising, this trend is not necessarily a sign that the crisis is easing.

This drop off coincides with the foreclosure moratoriums adopted by several large, national banks in the aftermath of the robo-signing scandals.⁸ Although the moratoriums were lifted, Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman's October 2010 order that attorneys signing affidavits in foreclosure filings attest to the accuracy of the documents they submit⁹ has continued to slow the pace of foreclosures.

Further, mortgage default rates, a precursor to later foreclosures, increased in 54 of New York's 62 counties from the end of 2009 to end of 2010.¹⁰ Statewide, nearly one in ten mortgages was 90 days past due at the end of the second quarter of 2011, according to data made available by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.¹¹ Moreover, this is not singularly a subprime phenomenon. Fifty-four percent of the 65,000 loans that were 90 days past due in New York State in November 2010 were prime loans, with subprime making up 32 percent and Alt-A the remaining 14 percent.¹²

⁶ NYU Furman Center analysis of data from Public Data Corporation and NYC Department of Finance.

⁷ Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit, August 2011. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Accessed Nov. 2011 at: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/national_economy/householdcredit/DistrictReport_Q22011.pdf

⁸ Streitfeld, David. "Bank of America to Freeze Foreclosure Cases." *New York Times*. October 1, 2010.

⁹ Administrative Order of the Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts, A0/431/11, March 2, 2011.

¹⁰ Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit, August 2011. Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Accessed Nov. 2011 at: http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/national_economy/householdcredit/DistrictReport_Q22011.pdf

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Aggregated Prime, Subprime and Alt-A State Loan Conditions. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, November 2010. Accessed Nov. 2011 at: <http://www.newyorkfed.org/creditconditions/>

Meanwhile, housing prices continue to decline or remain low in most parts of the state.¹³ As a result, fewer homeowners are able to sell their property to escape the foreclosure process. Ten percent of the properties that received a foreclosure notice in New York City in 2007 were sold to a third party within one year; but only five percent of the properties that received a foreclosure notice in the first half of 2010 did so. At the same time, the number of properties going to auction has increased. Of all of the properties that received a *lis pendens* filing in 2005, 10 percent eventually went to auction, but 20 percent of the properties that received a foreclosure notice in 2007 have gone to auction.¹⁴

Finally, changes to the laws governing the foreclosure process, combined with the sheer volume of foreclosure filings, have dramatically slowed the process of resolving these foreclosures. In 2007, the typical property that went to auction (the last stage in the foreclosure process) had received a foreclosure notice one year earlier; by 2010, that time period had doubled.¹⁵ Properties going to auction now most likely received their foreclosure notices in 2009. Although some homeowners will be able to escape foreclosure early through modifications and short sales, many of the 10,000 foreclosure actions filed this year in New York City are likely to drag on at least until 2013.

In sum, even if the economy and housing prices were to recover sharply in the near future, the need for foreclosure mitigation services would be with us for at least a few more years, as the backlog of existing foreclosures and the number of people in default who may enter foreclosure

¹³NYU Furman Center analysis of 2011 sales data from Zillow.com.

¹⁴Data current as of December 31, 2010. Source: NYU Furman Center analysis of data from New York City Department of Finance Automated City Register Information System and Public Data Corporation.

¹⁵NYU Furman Center analysis of data from Public Data Corporation and NYC Department of Finance.

soon, work through the system. And of course, there unfortunately is almost no chance that the economy and housing prices will fully recover in the near future, so the job losses, unaffordable loan terms, health and life crises, negative equity, and other drivers of foreclosure are likely to continue for some time.

Foreclosure impacts

Over the last several years, researchers at NYU's Furman Center have carefully documented the costs foreclosures impose beyond the individual homeowners. Children for example, suffer: more than 20,000 students lived in a building that entered foreclosure in the 2006-07 school year, and those students were considerably more likely to change schools than their peers by the following school year.¹⁶ Further, the schools that they ended up attending were of poorer quality, on average, than the schools they attended previously. We are now studying how foreclosures, and the moves they precipitate, affect children's performance on standardized tests.

Tenants also suffer when their landlords are foreclosed upon, which may happen even though the tenant has paid the rent and has not contributed in any way to the landlord's default. More than half of all properties in New York City that enter foreclosure have more than one unit, and we estimate that in 2009, buildings entering foreclosure in New York City were home to about 25,000 renter households.¹⁷ Since 2009, renters have been partially protected from immediate eviction by the federal Protecting Tenants in Foreclosure Act and a similar state law. But some

¹⁶Been, V., Ellen, I. E., Schwartz, A.E., Steifel, L., Weinstein, M. (2011). "Does Losing Your Home Mean Losing Your School? Effects of Foreclosures on the School Mobility of Children." *Regional Science and Urban Economics*: 41 (4).

¹⁷NYU Furman Center analysis of data from Public Data Corporation and NYC Department of Finance.

renters nevertheless are forced to move, even if current with their rent, because a financially distressed landlord misses utility payments or skimps on maintenance. Despite legal protections, parties buying the property out of foreclosure also sometimes bully tenants into leaving.

Foreclosures also affect neighboring owners. Our research found that homes located in close proximity to foreclosed properties experience price declines, even after controlling for previous price trends in the neighborhood. A single foreclosure can reduce prices of homes within 250 feet by 1-2 percent. Concentrated foreclosures can affect surrounding property values in a larger area; three foreclosure filings within 500 feet of a home will depress its sale value by about three percent.¹⁸ This can create a vicious cycle: concentrated foreclosures can drive down prices in a community, which in turn leads to additional foreclosures. In our study of subprime loans in New York City, we found that a foreclosure rate above three percent was associated with a 30 percent increase in the likelihood a borrower in that neighborhood will default, even after controlling for borrower risk, loan characteristics, and other characteristics of the neighborhood.¹⁹

At any point in the foreclosure process, the property may become vacant: owner occupiers may move out because they know they will eventually be evicted, and, as mentioned before, renters may move out because services or maintenance may decline. These vacant homes make a community less attractive, and can invite vermin or garbage, or – worse yet – crime. The Furman Center is now conducting a detailed study of the locations of every crime in New York City from 2004 to 2008, and matching those crimes to the location of every foreclosure. While our results

¹⁸Schuetz, J., Been, V., and Ellen, I.G. (2008). „Neighborhood Effects of Concentrated Mortgage Foreclosures.” *Journal of Housing Economics*: 17(4). Available at: <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1051137708000338>

¹⁹Chan, S., Gedal, M., Been, V., & Haughwout, A. (2011). The Role of Neighborhood Characteristics in Mortgage Defaults Risk: Evidence from New York City. *NYU Furman Center Working Paper*. Available at: http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/Pathways_1_Newest_with_Figures_Working_Paper.pdf

are still preliminary, after we controlled for neighborhood demographics and other patterns, we found that a single new foreclosure filing on a block is associated with a one percent increase in total crime and a two percent increase in violent crime on that same block in the following quarter. An additional bank-owned property on a block leads to a three percent increase in total crime and a nearly six percent increase in violent crimes. Our paper is limited to New York City, but it is likely that foreclosures also lead to increased crimes in affected neighborhoods throughout the state.

Foreclosure Counseling and Mortgage Modifications

Since the start of the foreclosure crisis, New York State has been a leader in adopting reforms aimed at keeping homeowners in their homes when possible, ensuring tenants and homeowners are treated fairly in foreclosure proceedings, and mitigating the effects of unavoidable foreclosures. While we have not studied the effects of each of the state's initiatives, our work does shed light on the efficacy of the state's investments in foreclosure counseling.

We studied nearly 29,000 mortgages issued in New York City from 2004 to 2008 that became delinquent between 2008 and 2010.²⁰ The mortgage data, accessed through a partnership with researchers at the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, includes detailed information on the loan terms, the properties, and the borrowers. Additionally, we were able to match these

²⁰Been, V., Weselcouch, M., Voicu, I., & Murff, S. (2011). Determinants of the Incidence of Loan Modifications. *NYU Furman Center Working Paper*. Available at: http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/Determinants_of_Mods_October_2011_Final_1.pdf

loans to data about which borrowers received counseling through the Center for New York City Neighborhoods (CNYCN).

Controlling for all known characteristics of the borrower (such as income, FICO score, and property type), the mortgage (terms and rates, debt-to-income ratio, loan-to-value ratio) and the neighborhood surrounding the property (demographics and market characteristics), we found that the nearly 700 delinquent borrowers who received CNYCN counseling were 30 percent more likely than those who did not receive counseling to obtain a modification. Again, our results are still under peer review, and are therefore preliminary.

Our study cannot determine whether CNYCN-funded counseling *caused* the borrower to be more likely to receive a modification. It may be, instead, that those who seek counseling have characteristics – like tenacity or ability to manage bureaucracy - that make it more likely that they will obtain modifications. But it does indicate that people with the same credit score, income, and loan types who decided to go to counseling were considerably more likely to end up in a modification. Further, those borrowers who received a modification after counseling were no more likely than other borrowers to re-default, after controlling for the modification terms, the borrowers' risk, and neighborhood factors.

In summary, our data show that the foreclosure crisis likely will be with us for some time. We know that foreclosures impose substantial harms, not only on homeowners, but also on tenants, children, neighbors, and taxpayers. And finally, our findings make clear that the intervention of foreclosure counseling is associated with a greater likelihood that borrowers will receive modifications. Thank you and we can now take any questions.

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