How Accident-Prone Is America’s Housing Finance System? The Unnoticed Erosion of Stability Since 2022 (Part 2 of 2)
Introduction
America’s housing finance system (HFS), which today funds approximately $13 trillion in first mortgages for nearly 50 million homes, is one of the largest parts of the broader U.S. financial system and has long been a major source of government support for homeownership. Yet historically, it has been critically prone to instability, as housing finance was uniquely at the heart of the two largest financial crises since World War II: the savings & loan (S&L) crisis of 1989 and the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009.
These two events have proven how difficult it is to spot and remediate potential HFS instability when stresses have already begun to develop. That makes it essential for policymakers to continually monitor HFS stability and take the necessary actions to get ahead of problems. Unfortunately, more than 15 years after the GFC, it is not at all clear that any part of the federal government is currently prioritizing doing just that on a sustained or comprehensive basis. The purpose of this two-part series is to assess the stability of the HFS today and to indicate where policymakers should focus to ensure it stays strong for the foreseeable future.
In Part 1 of this two-part series, I examined the stability of the HFS as of 2022, noting very significant improvement since the days of the GFC via legislative reforms (primarily the Dodd-Frank Act), new and changed regulations, and conservatorship directives.1 However, I also identified four specific areas of unfinished business,2 where stability issues remained unresolved and outstanding as of that date.
In this Part 2, I analyze what has changed since 2022 to assess the potential instability of today’s HFS. This examination is divided into two topics:
- A progress report on the actions that have been taken in the last three and a half years in light of the still unaddressed four sources of potential instability identified in Part 1 as “unfinished business”; and
- The unintended collateral damage to HFS stability by two key mortgage credit pricing actions taken by the Biden Administration in 2021 through 2023, which could potentially grow larger in the next several years.
I will also briefly discuss potential changes that could result from proposed, but not finalized, changes in bank capital requirements. This will be followed by a conclusion that highlights the need for the federal government to continually monitor HFS stability and take the necessary actions to head off identified risks before a future financial crisis materializes. I have also suggested an initial agenda for that effort.
Progress report on the four identified sources of “unfinished business” and potential HFS instability
Since the end of 2022, virtually no explicit action has been taken to address the four sources of instability identified in Part 1 as “unfinished business.” However, two developments are worth noting:
- Capitalization. The government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have continued to retain earnings to build their capital. Given that the GSEs currently enjoy explicit government credit support, however, they remain a very stable part of the HFS regardless of their own capital levels.3
- Non-bank mortgage servicer liquidity. The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) issued a report4 in 2024 highlighting that such servicers were poorly equipped to handle stress-market demands on their liquidity. However, there has not so far been any seemingly organized follow-up to actually reduce this risk to stability, with the limited and indirect exception of the proposed bank regulatory capital changes, which are briefly discussed below.
The fact that HFS stability has not been intentionally and materially improved in any significant way since 2022 shows how little attention policymakers in Washington have paid to this issue in recent years.
The impact of the Biden-era pricing changes
Recent pricing changes made in 2021 and 2023 have shifted the market shares among the four “channels” by which U.S. homeowners obtain mortgage credit. As each of these channels has its own well-established pattern of procyclicality,5 the shift has, net, resulted in weakened stability by increasing the overall procyclicality of the HFS.
The specific pricing changes were as follows:
- In February 2023, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) reduced its key annual mortgage insurance premium from 0.85 percent to 0.55 percent, a significant decrease.6
- Overlapping with this change were increases in GSE guarantee fees (G-fees). Examining the monthly reporting of average G-fees,7 it is clear that they were about 0.55 to 0.57 percent per annum in 2019 and then increased smoothly starting at the end of 2021 to reach the 0.63 to 0.65 percent range by 2023, an increase of about 0.08 percent. This reflected a decision to implement a new and higher capital requirement in late 2021.8
The relative effects of these pricing changes on each of the four market channels were, in order of market size:
- A significant decline in GSE market share. The GSEs are the most stable of the four channels, with a history of having a countercyclical market share. After rising during COVID-19 stresses, their share declined by 2023 to about 45 percent, its long-time non-stress period average level.9 Instead of stabilizing at that level, however, the share unexpectedly continued to decline, falling to 37 percent most recently. That’s a one-sixth reduction in the underlying non-stressed market share for the GSEs, and the timing makes it reasonably traceable to the pricing changes. Because there is now considerably less of the most stable — and countercyclical in terms of market share — source of mortgage funding, the stability of the HFS has clearly, though modestly, declined.
- No pickup in share by banks/portfolio lenders. This channel includes mortgage “whole loans” (meaning unsecuritized loans) held by banks, other depositories (e.g., credit unions) and certain other lenders (e.g., insurance companies). As private-sector lenders, they have typical procyclicality that reflects the stress level in the markets, so the decline in the banks/portfolio lenders’ share during the COVID-19 stress years was expected. However, it then returned afterward to its historic, post-GFC non-stress market share of 30 percent, but no higher.10 This was a modest surprise, as they were expected to gain share from the GSEs, with which they are known to compete for lower-risk borrowers. This may perhaps reflect some loss of share to the FHA at the same time.
- A modest recovery in FHA and VA market share. Mortgages insured by the FHA and also the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)11 are securitized via Ginnie Mae, which gives investors in them a full government guarantee against credit losses. This, in turn, would normally support a countercyclical market share. Instead, their 2014-2019 share of about 23 percent declined during the pandemic,12 but climbed afterward to about 26 percent, reflecting both the end of those stress years and the major price cut. This was, however, only a 3-percentage-point increase from before 2020, which seems small given the size of the price cut. Nevertheless, it probably did modestly improve HFS stability.
- A recent pickup in the private label securitization (PLS) market share. PLS is the most controversial of the four channels.13 After the GFC and before 2019, its market share was almost non-existent, but its post-pandemic share had been inching up, reaching 2-3 percent by 2021-2022 and 7 percent most recently. While many factors could account for this growth,14 it is well known that the PLS channel sources several different types of mortgages but, more than anything, competes with banks (e.g., on large mortgages) and the GSEs (for most other types).15 So with price increases for the GSE channel, an increase in PLS market share is not surprising. And, of course, maybe just enough time has passed since the GFC that institutional investors are once again willing to participate in PLS transactions on some modest but routine basis.16 Regardless, that market share growth has a decidedly negative impact on HFS stability, given how extremely procyclical the PLS market has proven to be due to its total dependence on institutional investors showing up to purchase mortgage-based securities.17
Looking at all four channels, it is clear that pricing changes at the GSEs and the FHA in the early 2020s and their impact on markets over the next several years have, net, decreased the stability of the HFS. This is because it resulted in less GSE and arguably more PLS market share, both of which lead to that result. But the net change, at least so far, seems modest.18
Bank regulatory capital changes on mortgages are near and may help to reduce procyclicality
The Federal Reserve is leading an effort to revise certain bank capital regulations affecting the ownership of both mortgage loans and mortgage servicing rights (MSRs). The effort follows observations that banks — which, along with thrifts, once dominated most aspects of the mortgage business — have given up much of their market share to others, especially nonbank mortgage corporations (NMCs).
Those changes will reduce capital requirements on certain types of lower-risk mortgage loans held on bank balance sheets and also reverse some of the “punitive” (as the industry often refers to them) increases in capital against MSRs.19 While the impact on procyclicality by banks holding more mortgages long-term is difficult to assess,20 an increase in their holding of MSRs would definitely increase that stability, as it would reduce the problematic need for NMCs to meet stress-market liquidity requirements.
Opinions vary considerably on what the actual net impact of these changes might be on HFS stability. They could potentially be one of the more impactful events concerning the stability of the HFS over the next several years, or they could change little at all. However, realistically, given the time needed to finalize and implement regulatory changes, they probably will not affect much of anything until 2028 at the earliest.
Conclusion: Is anyone minding the store?
The country’s HFS was clearly strongly prone to instability in 2005-2006, as the GFC that began soon afterward demonstrated. The reforms that followed substantially reduced this tendency. However, Part 1 identified four areas of “unfinished business” where systemic risks remained as of 2022.
Over the past three-plus years, as described above, the stability of the HFS has not just stopped improving, it has actually modestly deteriorated. Prospectively, upcoming changes to bank capital requirements may improve it modestly — but only commencing several years from now — and even this is just an educated guess at this point.
What is perhaps most concerning, given the HFS’s uniquely poor history of instability and the damage it has caused, is that the federal government does not seem to be systematically monitoring or improving its stability. If that were the case, the government would have stepped in by now — presumably through the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), created specifically to anticipate threats to financial stability — and taken a series of actions to address the four unfinished business issues described in Part 1. Instead, almost nothing has visibly been done; in the case of the stability of mortgage servicing by NMCs, an FSOC report on the issue has so far been just a paper exercise, with no obvious follow-up actions taken as a result.
Thus, unless FSOC or some other designated part of the federal government21 starts comprehensively monitoring systemic risks in the HFS and then providing leadership to develop and implement the changes needed to resolve them, we will still have the HFS continue to be a larger threat than necessary to the stability of the broader financial system.
If such a comprehensive monitoring program were put in place, I would recommend that its initial agenda cover three issues requiring leadership to implement changes through legislation, regulation, or other action, and three issues requiring ongoing monitoring of the HFS for existing and emerging risks.
- Changes leadership should undertake:
- GSE capital requirement. Review and revise the current minimum regulatory capital requirement formulae for the GSEs to ensure that they accurately reflect the actual risks being taken.22 This speaks to the total required and also should ensure that individual transactions have the proper economic risk-versus-reward incentive in terms of their capital impact — especially with respect to CRT transactions.
- Stress market access to liquidity by non-bank mortgage servicers. Spearhead legislation or regulation to improve the ability of NMCs to meet their liquidity needs during times of stress, ideally without any additional subsidy from, or added risk to, the taxpayer. 23
- Private mortgage insurer eligibility requirements. Revise GSE eligibility requirements for private mortgage insurers to require capital against mortgage credit risks consistent with what the GSEs themselves are required to hold.
- Current and emerging issues that could increase instability and thus warrant ongoing monitoring:
- PLS market share. If it grows too high (my estimate is perhaps above 10 percent), it could contribute to excessive procyclicality and should be restrained from further growth.24
- Non-bank mortgage servicers’ access to liquidity in the market. How much access do NMCs currently have, and what would they likely have during a period of stress? Ideally, this access would be increasing.
- Concentration of HFS interest rate and credit risk. This is a core monitoring function, as too much concentration of the former was a root cause of the S&L crisis of 1989, and too much of the latter was a root cause of the GSEs needing to be placed into conservatorship in 2008.25
Footnotes
- [1] Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), entered conservatorship in 2008 during the GFC, with their regulator —the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) — also serving as their conservator. As such, the FHFA became in total operational control of the two companies. “Directives” is the term for the official orders from the FHFA to the two GSEs on virtually any issue regarding how the two companies are to operate.
- [2] The four “unfinished business” topics are: (1) GSE capitalization remains significantly below regulatory requirements, and private mortgage insurers are likely undercapitalized as well; (2) risk concentration at the GSEs is rising as the program of using credit risk transfer (CRT) transactions to diversify credit risk away from the two companies has weakened; (3) a long-standing historical bias toward excessive procyclicality; and (4) the potential inability of non-bank mortgage servicers to meet liquidity demands in stressed markets.
- [3] The GSEs have enjoyed top-tier, stable market access since entering conservatorship in September 2008 because they are supported by explicit government backing through the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement (PSPA) that each has with Treasury. They have thus been able to pay interest rates on their debt at just slightly above Treasury rates, despite having very inadequate levels of capital, including near zero at one point. Assuming the government continues to provide such support, the amount of capital held by the GSEs is less about ensuring their stability and more about protecting taxpayers from losses. Specifically, a higher level of GSE capital means there is a larger buffer to absorb losses before taxpayers would be called upon under the terms of the PSPA. Because both GSEs are currently retaining all their earnings, their capital levels — and thus the protection for taxpayers — are consistently increasing. For example, Fanny Mae’s equity-to-assets ratio rose substantially from 1.40 percent at the end of 2022 to 2.69 percent by mid-2026, meaning taxpayer exposure to mortgage risk is steadily declining.
- [4] See: Report on Nonbank Mortgage Servicing, from FSOC (https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/FSOC-2024-Nonbank-Mortgage-Servicing-Report.pdf?ref=levernews.com ).
- [5] Procyclical generally means that something rises and falls in line with the strength of the economy. In this case, it means that a channel’s volume or market share declines during bad times (i.e. when credit risk on mortgages is high) and increases during good times (i.e. when credit risk on mortgages is low). On balance, greater pro-cyclicality amplifies economic cycles in the overall economy — or, in this case, in mortgage markets — rather than dampening them.
- [6] The FHA also charges a one-time upfront fee in addition to a per annum one.
- [7] See the Urban Institute’s Housing Finance at a Glance: A Monthly Chartbook, September 2026, p. 31, “Guarantee Fees Charged on New Acquisitions.”
- [8] The GSEs, unlike the FHA, do not have a government-set single price for most mortgage credit. Instead, their regulator sets a risk-sensitive capital requirement, and the GSEs must price mortgage credit in a way that produces a market return on the capital required, which varies loan-by-loan by product and customer risk characteristics. As a result, the average G-fee for each GSE will slightly vary month to month. At the end of 2020, a new, higher regulatory capital requirement regime was set, and late in 2021 the GSEs were directed by their conservator to raise pricing to earn the necessary return on the increased requirement.
- [9] The GSE market share remained close to 45 percent throughout most of the non-stress years from 2014 to 2019, as it had for many years before the mortgage bubble began to emerge in the early 2000s. Its countercyclical nature was evident during periods of stress, when its share rose to around 60 percent — as it did during COVID-19 — and for several years during the GFC, when it climbed even above 60 percent.
- [10] The banks, etc. share was about 30 percent during the non-stress years of 2014 to 2019, and it returned right back to that level after the pandemic. During COVID-19 stresses, it declined to the low 20 percent range.
- [11] This channel also includes loans originated via the U.S. Department of Agriculture for rural housing, but the amount is quite low. All three types of mortgages are securitized via Ginnie Mae, so this channel is also known as the Ginnie Mae channel.
- [12] The FHA and VA market share declined significantly to nearly 15 percent in 2021. This is in contrast to its growth during the stress years of the GFC.
- [13] The PLS market share, which soared during the bubble, collapsed during the GFC. In fact, the PLS market was all but dead from 2008 to 2018, accounting for less than 1 percent share each year. This reflected that it was the center of just about every weakness in the mortgage system revealed by the GFC (e.g., risky structures, such as teaser rates; risky loans via “low doc/no doc” lending, etc.), all of which led to it having the largest rate of credit loss among the four channels. Unsurprisingly, this led to its collapse during the GFC.
- [14] For example, unrelated to this article, lenders may be “reaching” to generate volume through the PLS market given that the current volume of new mortgages being made is cyclically low and that lending funded via PLS is subject to fewer regulatory and legal restrictions.
- [15] One type of mortgage made through the PLS channel competes with FHA mortgages because it is riskier than usual. However, because the FHA requires a very low down payment (just 3.5 percent, which is utilized by about two-thirds of its borrowers), this specific competition is limited.
- [16] There has also been a wide range of reforms via regulation and legislation to “clean up” the PLS industry, which presumably over time has made investor confidence easier to regain.
- [17] Colloquially, this is described as “the PLS market has no ‘balance sheet’ of its own.”
- [18] It is unclear whether the market share held by PLS will continue to rise over the next few years as the impact of the pricing changes works its way through the HFS. An increase to perhaps 10 percent or higher market share would, in my view, become problematic from a stability perspective.
- [19] Given the existence of floors and ceilings in various bank capital regulations, percentage comparisons of “before” versus “after” are hard to make. However, the core bank capital requirement for MSRs was increased to 2.5 times its former level. This does seem to justify the “punitive” characterization.
- [20] It depends on which channel previously funded the share that moves to banks. For example, if banks take share away from PLS, it would increase stability, but if they take share from the GESs, it would reduce it.
- [21] FSOC is only a coordinating committee and lacks authority to implement any changes. Realistically, then, responsibility for monitoring the stability of the HFS should rest with either Treasury or the Federal Reserve. Treasury is probably best suited to the task because, as I learned during my time as CEO of Freddie Mac, the Federal Reserve has a long history of avoiding issues related to the GSEs.
- [22] If this seems obvious, the long history of the GSEs and other federally created specialty mortgage lending institutions says otherwise. In general, before the GFC, government policy was to set very low capital requirements for all specialty mortgage-related lenders to “help homeownership”— including the GSEs, the Federal Home Loan Banks, and the S&Ls. This, however, also resulted in inadequate safety and soundness, which led, for example, to the GSEs being placed into conservatorship. In response, the current GSE capital requirement, at least in my view, reflects the opposite policy goal: attempting to shrink the GSEs’ market share by creating a capital requirement higher than justified by the actual risks. The details of the capital requirement formulae also do a poor job of incentivizing individual transactions to be conducted on an economic risk-versus-reward basis and thus need significant revision. Instead, it seems time for a capital requirement that is not biased high or low, as part of a properly safe and sound HFS that also supports homeownership over the long term.
- [23] The industry has addressed its need for access to liquidity during periods of stress by proposing plans for the government to provide it on a broad, and even subsidized, basis. Policymakers have not received these proposals well, viewing them as being too self-serving. Instead, solutions could include requiring services to maintain higher minimum liquidity levels, making technical changes to how servicer advances are handled so banks can more readily lend against them, and encouraging non-bank servicers to include more sub-servicing in their business mix (since that does not draw on their liquidity). In short, there is no silver bullet that doesn’t involve more government risk and subsidy, but there are several technical changes that can, together, meaningfully contribute to reduced risk exposure.
- [24] Many conservative policy specialists view the PLS market very favorably with respect to one issue: it is supported by private capital, not government. However, this article focuses on stability, and the PLS market is by far the most unstable, procyclical channel among the four.
- [25] The other root cause in both instances was inadequate capitalization.